ABSTRACT:

IP was being shown everywhere. To advertisers and other places, even from SPAM who compromised users identity. Developed software that would hide ip address, outlined a security protocol that uses resource constrained trusted hardware to facilitate anonymous IP-address blocking in anonym zing networks such as Tor. Tor allows users to access Internet services privately by using a series of Tor routers to obfuscate the route from the client to the server, thereby hiding the client’s IP address from the server. The success of Tor, however, has been limited because of malicious users who misuse the network. Administrators block all known exit nodes of anonymizing networks, denying anonymous access to misbehaving and behaving users alike. To address this problem, we present Nymble, a system in which servers can blacklist the misbehaving users, thereby blocking. Our system is thus agnostic to different servers’ definitions of misbehavior servers can blacklist users for whatever reason, and the privacy of blacklisted users is maintained. The IP-address anonymity provided by Tor, however, makes it difficult for administrators to deny access to such offenders. As a result, administrators resort to blocking all Tor exit nodes, effectively denying anonymous access for all Tor’s users.

Keywords: Anonymous blacklisting, anonymizing networks, privacy, Nymble revocation.

INTRODUCTION

Anonymizing networks such as [18] re-route a user’s traffic between several nodes in different domains. Since these nodes are operated independently, users are able to trust the anonymizing network to provide anonymity. Real-world deployments of anonymizing networks, however, have had limited success because of their misuse. Administrators of websites are unable to blacklist malicious users’ IP addresses because of their anonymity. Left with no other choice, these administrators opt to blacklist the entire anonymizing network. This approach eliminates malicious activity through such networks, but at the cost of the anonymity of honest users. In other words, a few —bad apples—
can spoil the fun for everybody else using the anonymizing network. (In fact, this has happened repeatedly with To solve this problem, we present a secure protocol based on trusted hardware that allows servers to block anonymous users without knowledge of their actual IP addresses. Although this work applies to anonymizing networks in general, we consider Tor for purposes of exhibition. Building and prototyping a system based on our proposed solution is ongoing work. In this paper we present our proposed solution and protocol. Anonymizing networks such as Tor allow users to access Internet services privately by using a series of routers to hide the client’s IP address from the server. The success of such networks, however, has been limited by users employing this anonymity for abusive purposes such as defacing popular websites. Website administrators routinely rely on IP-address blocking for disabling access to misbehaving users, but blocking IP addresses is not practical if the abuser routes through an anonymizing network[36].

There are several solutions to this problem, each providing some degree of accountability. In pseudonymous credential systems [14], [17], [23], [28], users log into web sites using pseudonyms, which can be added to a blacklist if a user misbehaves. Unfortunately, this approach results in pseudonymity for all users, and weakens the anonymity provided by the anonymizing network.

Anonymous credential systems [10], [12] employ group signatures. Basic group signatures [1], [6], [15] allow servers to revoke a misbehaving user’s anonymity by complaining to a group manager. Servers must query the group manager for every authentication, and thus, lacks scalability. Traceable signatures [26] allow the group manager to release a trapdoor that allows all signatures generated by a particular user to be traced; such an approach does not provide the backward unlinkability [30].

Subjective blacklisting is also better suited to servers such as Wikipedia, where misbehaviors such as questionable edits to a Webpage, are hard to define in mathematical terms. In some systems, misbehavior can indeed be defined precisely. For instance, double spending of an “e-coin” is considered a misbehavior in anonymous e-cash systems [8], [13], following which the offending user is de-anonymized. Unfortunately, such systems work for only narrow definitions of misbehavior—it is difficult to map more complex notions of misbehavior onto “double spending” or related approaches [32].

With dynamic accumulators [11], [31], a revocation operation results in a new accumulator and public parameters for the group, and all other existing users’ credentials must be updated, making it impractical. Verifier-local revocation (VLR) [2], [7], [9] fixes this shortcoming by requiring the server (“verifier”) to perform only local updates during revocation.

Websites, however, can blacklist users by obtaining a seed for a particular nymble, allowing them to link future nymbles from the same user — those used before the complaint remain unlinkable. Servers can therefore blacklist anonymous users without knowledge of their IP addresses while allowing behaving users to connect anonymously. Our system ensures that users are aware of their blacklist status before they present a nymble, and disconnect immediately if they are blacklisted. Although our work applies to anonymizing networks in general, we consider Tor for purposes of exposition. In fact, any number of anonymizing networks can rely on the same Nymble system, blacklisting anonymous users regardless of their anonymizing network(s) of choice.

Blacklisting anonymous users. We provide a means by which servers can blacklist users of an anonymizing network while maintaining their privacy.

• Practical performance. Our protocol makes use of inexpensive symmetric cryptographic
operations to significantly outperform the alternatives.

- Open-source implementation. With the goal of contributing a workable system, we have built an open-source implementation of Nymble, which is publicly available. We provide performance statistics to show that our system is indeed practical.

We present a secure system called Nymble, which provides all the following properties: anonymous authentication, backward unlinkability, subjective blacklisting, fast authentication speeds, rate-limited anonymous connections, revocation auditability (where users can verify whether they have been blacklisted), and also addresses the Sybil attack [19] to make its deployment practical.

OVERVIEW TO NYMBLE

Servers can therefore blacklist anonymous users without knowledge of their IP addresses while allowing behaving users to connect anonymously. Our system ensures that users are aware of their blacklist status before they present a nymble, and disconnect immediately if they are blacklisted. Although our work applies to anonymizing networks in general, we consider Tor for purposes of exposition. In fact, any number of anonymizing networks can rely on the same Nymble system, blacklisting anonymous users regardless of their anonymizing network(s) of choice.

The Pseudonym Manager

The user must first contact the Pseudonym Manager (PM) and demonstrate control over a resource; for IP-address blocking, the user must connect to the PM.

The Nymble Manager

To provide the requisite cryptographic protection and security properties, the NM encapsulates nymbles within nymble tickets. Servers wrap seeds into linking tokens, and therefore, we will speak of linking tokens being used to link future nymble tickets. The importance of these constructs will become apparent as we proceed.

Blacklisting a User

Users who make use of anonymizing networks expect their connections to be anonymous. If a server obtains a seed for that user, however, it can link that user’s subsequent connections. It is of utmost importance then, that users be notified of their blacklist status before they present a nymble ticket to a server. In our system, the user can download the server’s blacklist and verify her status. If blacklisted, the user disconnects immediately. IP address blocking employed by Internet services. There are, however, some inherent limitations to using IP addresses as the scarce resource. If a user can obtain multiple addresses she can circumvent both nymble-based and regular IP-address blocking. Subnet-based blocking alleviates this problem, and while it is possible to modify our system to support subnet-based blocking, new privacy challenges emerge; a more thorough description is left for future work [36].

Notifying the User of Blacklist Status

Users who make use of anonymizing networks expect their connections to be anonymous. If a server obtains a seed for that user, however, it can link that user’s subsequent connections. It is of utmost importance then that users be notified of their blacklist status before they present a nymble
ticket to a server. In our system, the user can download the server’s blacklist and verify her status. If blacklisted, the user disconnects immediately. Since the blacklist is cryptographically signed by the NM, the authenticity of the blacklist is easily verified if the blacklist was updated in the current time period (only one update to the blacklist per time period is allowed).

**CONCLUSION**

We have proposed and built a comprehensive credential system called Nymble, which can be used to add a layer of accountability to any publicly known anonymizing network. Servers can blacklist misbehaving users while maintaining their privacy, and I show how these properties can be attained in a way that is practical, efficient, and sensitive to the needs of both users and services. I hope that our work will increase the mainstream acceptance of anonymizing networks such as Tor, which has, thus far, been completely blocked by several services because of users who abuse their anonymity.

**REFERENCES**


[35] Nymble: Blocking Misbehaving Users in Anonymizing Networks Patrick P. Tsang, Apu Kapadia, Member, IEEE, Cory Cornelius, and Sean W. Smith; IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON DEPENDABLE AND SECURE COMPUTING, VOL. 8, NO. 2, MARCH-APRIL 2011